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Abstract: 
This paper considers the various regulatory approaches implemented by insurance regulators and 
supervisors globally in order to achieve the objective of inclusive insurance market development. The 
primary question that this paper seeks to address is: what is the optimal regulatory approach to be followed 
by a particular country to promote increased access to insurance in a particular product market or across 
multiple product markets? 
From the experience of the countries scrutinised as part of this synthesis process, five distinctive regulatory 
approaches to the promotion of access to insurance have been identified. These five regulatory approaches 
can be located on a continuum according to the level of state intervention in or direction of the market. Each 
of the approaches are defined and described in detail in Section 2.2. They are: 
Public provision approach: the state identifies the risk to be covered and either acts as risk carrier itself or 
directly and/or indirectly subsidises insurance to the population, often to achieve a public policy objective 
ancillary to the insurance sector, such as health or rural development. 
Directive approach: the state requires insurers to meet certain targets in terms of access to insurance. 
Regulatory tools are therefore used to leverage the market mechanism. 
Concessionary approach: this approach relies on creating market incentives rather than direct state 
intervention to achieve the desired objective of access to insurance. It does so by creating proportionate 
regulatory concessions to encourage provision of access-friendly products as defined in the local context. 
Nudge approach: the state creates an enabling environment for access to insurance and may lower the 
compliance burden across the board to promote access, but there are no direct state intervention and no 
explicit concessions for access to insurance. 
Long-term market development approach: this approach entails no direct state direction of the market, with 
the focus instead being on building market and state infrastructure and capacity over time, before access to 
insurance can be pursued as an explicit objective. 
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1.Introduction: 
Note that the approaches are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Some may operate in 
combination for different product markets in the 
same country. The synthesis exercise furthermore 
revealed that not all regulatory approaches can be 
applied in all market circumstances. Particular 
approaches are more appropriate when certain 
market conditions apply, and inappropriate when 
those conditions are not present. The paper 
therefore sets out to identify the most important 
triggers, referred to as conditioning factors, that 
determine whether a regulatory approach is 
appropriate or not. Identifying these conditioning 
factors is intended to assist financial sector 
policymakers, regulators and supervisors to decide 
which regulatory approach is best suited to their 
circumstances. 
2. Regulatory approaches  
This section considers the various regulatory 
approaches to the promotion of access to insurance, 
internationally, how they are defined and how they 
impact market development.  
2.1. Defining a regulatory approach  
Governments set out to achieve particular public 
policy objectives. Making laws and regulations 
(collectively referred to as regulation) and 
enforcing compliance with these through 
supervision are the most important tools at the 
disposal of a government to achieve its objectives. 
There are different regulatory tools and different 
ways to deploy them. Some work under certain 
conditions and others under other conditions. 
Deciding which regulatory tools to deploy depends 
on the objectives to be achieved as well as the 
prevailing circumstances.  
The fundamental objective of the state is to 
maximise the welfare of its citizens. Increasing 
access to insurance can increase welfare by 
mitigating the financial impact of risks faced by 
households. Thus increasing access to insurance 
may be a policy objective in itself. Alternatively, it 
can be employed as a policy instrument that 
contributes to the achievement of broader social 
goals. For example, a government may set out to 
increase access to health insurance as an instrument 
to increase the general health of the population or 
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may build access to agricultural insurance as part 
of a rural development programme or to achieve 
broader food security objectives.  
Irrespective of whether promoting access to 
insurance is the primary policy objective or an 
instrument to achieve broader social objectives, 
country evidence reveals a standard set of 
regulatory approaches that can be deployed to 
promote access to insurance. These approaches 
differ primarily according to the extent of direct 
state intervention in the insurance market. The 
level of state intervention in or direction of the 
market, as opposed to allowing the market to 
develop entirely of its own accord, is thus proposed 
as the key aspect to differentiate between discrete 
regulatory approaches to the promotion of access to 
insurance. Note that state intervention includes not 
only direct assistance, subsidy for the provision of 
insurance, or mandatory insurance stipulations, but 
also includes the state creating, through regulatory 
and fiscal concessions, specific incentives to 
private insurance providers to expand their 
provision of services into low-income market 
segments.  
Based on the foregoing and for the purposes of this 
paper, a regulatory approach is defined as: a 
specific combination of regulatory and 
supervisory tools designed to achieve a series of 
policy goals via a specific level of state 
intervention within a defined product market or 
across a number of product markets to facilitate 
access to insurance. 
Policy objectives For example:-Access to 
Insurance-Food security-Healthcare-Rural 
upliftmentConditioning factors:1.Macroeconomic 
conditions2.Physical infrastructure3.Latent 
demand4.Market 
development5.Informality6.Public funding7.Public 
infrastructure8.Supervisory capacity9.Compliance 
burdenFiscaltoolsSurveillance toolsRegulatory 
approach:-Public provision approach-Directive 
approach-Concessionary approach-Nudge 
approach-Long term market development   
approachRegulatorytoolsEnforcement tools 
2.1.1. Policy objectives  
The specific policy objectives adopted in a 
particular country are a key driver in defining the 
regulatory approach as they determine the extent 
and nature of the regulator’s mandate.  
2.1.2. Conditioning factors  
To realise policy objectives through insurance will 
require the matching of products and clients 
through various models of distribution, entering 
into insurance contracts, and paying premiums and 
claims. The extent to which these actions can be 
performed in a particular country and market will 
depend on a number of factors. These factors 
determine or condition the feasibility of following a 
particular approach. For example, if a country lacks 
rural health facilities, implementing comprehensive 
national health insurance will be counter-
productive in rural areas. Or, if a country lacks 
sound life insurers, requiring insurers to sell a 
specific proportion of new policies to low-income 
households is likely to weaken rather than 
strengthen the overall life insurance market.  
The choice of most appropriate regulatory 
approach for a particular market or across markets 
depends on the interplay between various 
conditioning factors. For example: a country that is 
very prone to natural disasters may wish to 
improve the risk protection for rural households 
against natural disasters. To do so, it may decide 
that earthquake or flood insurance should be 
promoted. Yet market research may show that there 
is no established demand for insurance amongst 
farmers. A purely market-based approach is 
therefore unlikely to succeed. However, if the state 
has sufficient fiscal capacity, it has the option of 
subsidising insurance provision.  
2.1.3. Tools to implement a regulatory approach  
The right-hand column of Figure 1 indicates the 
basket of tools through which the regulatory 
approach is implemented. A distinction is made 
between fiscal tools, regulatory tools, surveillance 
tools and enforcement tools.  
Fiscal tools  
Fiscal tools are utilised either to directly extend 
access to specific insurance products, or to 
incentivise market players to extend access to 
insurance6. The fiscal tools that can be deployed as 
part of a regulatory approach to stimulastimulate 
access to insurance include both expenditure and 
revenue measures: 
Expenditure measures: Fiscal instruments can 
involve active spending by government to stimulate 
access to insurance. The commonest such tool 
would be subsidies. Subsidies can be both full, in 
which no premium contribution is required from 
the insured individual who is therefore typically 
automatically enrolled into the insurance scheme, 
or partial, where the insured is required to 
contribute a proportion of the premium. States can 
either subsidise the premium by paying the insurer 
on behalf of the insured individual, or can 
indirectly subsidise provision by performing certain 
insurance value chain services that would normally 
be covered by commercial insurers. These could 
include distribution or administration roles such as 
premium collection7, distributionthrough state 
entities8, conducting of risk assessments9, or even 
providing the underwriting vehicle10. 
Revenue measures: Revenue-based fiscal tools 
include tax concessions for insurers supplying the 
low-income market, particularly on indirect taxes 
such as VAT on premiums, but potentially also on 
direct taxes such as income tax for insurers. It can 
also entail reduced supervisory fees and levies for 
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certain types or insurers or activities. The 
application of such fiscal tools can be differentiated 
across discrete markets. For example: life 
premiums may be exempted from VAT, whilst 
non-life premiums are not. 
Regulatory tools 
Regulatory tools include the full spectrum of 
legally binding rules - legislation, regulations, 
supervisory directives, etc. - which can be used by 
the state to structure its own participation in the 
insurance market and to set the framework within 
which market players are allowed to operate. These 
regulatory tools can be broadly categorised into: (i) 
preconditions for entry into the market; and (ii) on-
going conditions for continued market 
participation. Below we briefly discuss those 
regulatory tools that can find particular application 
when seeking to promote access to insurance. 
1. Preconditions for entry include three main 
regulatory tools: licensing, ownership restrictions 
and capital requirements. Of these, the first and the 
last have been used to promote access to insurance: 
Licensing is the most basic form of entry 
restriction. A license gives the given entity 
permission to provide insurance products to clients. 
In order to receive an insurance license, the 
supervisor sets certain conditions that the entity 
must meet. Permitting entities that are cooperatives 
or mutuals to obtain an insurance operating license, 
for example, can be seen as promoting access to 
insurance. 
Capital requirements include both minimum size 
requirements (aimed at ensuring that insurers have 
sufficient capital to support their contractual 
obligations to policyholders) and variable capital 
adequacy requirements (intended to absorb 
unexpected losses incurred by insurers). Both 
instances may be used as tools to promote access to 
insurance. For example: entry barriers may be set 
proportionately for insurers limited to providing 
certain defined microinsurance products and 
variable requirements may be scaled to the nature, 
scale and complexity of the risk. 
2. On-going conditions for continued participation 
in the industry encompass a number of  
regulatory tools relevant for access to insurance, 
including:  
Market conduct rules aim to ensure that markets 
are sound, orderly and transparent, that users of 
financial markets are treated fairly, and that 
markets are free from misleading, manipulative or 
abusive conduct. Market conduct regulation 
includes the regulation of the distribution and 
servicing of insurance products. It has been used in 
a number of instances to promote access to 
insurance, including: creating a microinsurance-
specific category of intermediaries that can include 
entities such as MFIs, NGOs, retailers, mobile 
network vendors or other “client aggregators” 
outside of the traditional broker or agent space; 
reduced qualification and licensing requirements 
for intermediaries selling certain types of 
insurance; broadening of the range of functions that 
intermediaries may fulfil (for example including 
back-office administration functions and claims 
payment); or tailored commission structures to 
incentivise agents’ sales. 
Market conduct rules in the inclusive insurance 
space may also relate to specific consumer 
protection safeguards, such as: placing conditions 
on the sale of compulsory credit life insurance (for 
example, that the consumer must have a choice of 
insurance provider); imposing maximum periods 
for claims processing or requirements for what 
would be acceptable claims documentation; or 
stipulations regarding the contractual relationship 
between insurers, end-clients and third party 
administrators/client aggregators in the case of 
group underwriting. The latter can include 
requirements that a third party may not move the 
book without permission of a certain percentage of 
individuals, or that an individual certificate must be 
issued to each individual member stating for 
example the name of the insurer, the cover and 
premium obligations. 
Disclosure requirements: Though it forms part of 
market conduct regulation, regulation regarding 
disclosure of information warrants separate 
attention, as it is vital for the protection of 
consumers. Due to the crucial role information 
plays in insurance markets, a lack of full disclosure 
creates the potential for market abuse. The role of 
information extends beyond market abuse. When 
parties to a transaction have inadequate information 
on which to base their decisions, there may be a 
loss of efficiency to the extent that the parties price 
the cost of uncertainty into their transactions. 
However, excessive or complex information can be 
counterproductive as it confuses customers and 
therefore reduces transparency. 
Disclosure requirements are used in a number of 
instances to promote access to insurance, including: 
the requirement that disclosure be in the 
vernacular, simplified disclosure requirements (for 
example stipulating that disclosure details during 
the transaction may be abridged, provided that full 
details are provided after the sale in the written 
policy or using any appropriate electronic medium, 
and that the abridged disclosure gives the 
prospective policyholder a clear appreciation of his 
or her financial commitments), requirements for 
simplified policy documents with minimum levels 
of summary information clearly disclosed, or 
stating in what way information should be 
explained to customers or what level of advice 
should be provided. Disclosure requirements can 
also be tailored to allow for electronic or telephonic 
communication, but with certain consumer 
protection safeguards in place, for example 
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requiring that telephonic conversations be 
recorded. 
Governance and fiduciary duties: Governance 
provisions regulate the internal structures, controls, 
and procedures of financial institutions in an effort 
to ensure prudence, underpin trust, minimise 
conflicts of interest, and avoid consumer 
exploitation. Regulation and supervision supporting 
inclusive insurance markets may for example place 
minimum governance requirements15 on new 
institutional forms (such as mutual or cooperatives) 
allowed to underwrite microinsurance. Governance 
requirements are also particularly relevant where a 
country attempts to formalise entities that 
previously provided insurance on an informal basis. 
Liquidity requirements are designed to ensure that 
a regulated institution has the funds available to 
meet any undertakings it has made concerning the 
liquidity of its contractual obligations to 
consumers. Investment requirements included as 
part of a regulatory approach to facilitate access to 
insurance could include duration and asset-liability 
matching requirements (for example: where a 
concessionary regime defines microinsurance 
products to have a certain maximum term, liquid 
assets would be required to match the short-term 
contract obligations). 
Surveillance tools 
As well as establishing the rules for market 
operation through regulatory tools, regulators need 
to monitor the industry’s compliance with these 
rules. There are three basic methods for monitoring 
compliance, namely consumer complaints 
mechanisms, off-site and on-site monitoring: 
Complaints mechanisms. Supervisors rely on 
complaints by consumers to identify regulatory 
breaches. Monitoring complaints is the least 
intrusive and least costly approach to surveillance. 
An ombudsman is the traditional recourse 
mechanism for insurance industry disputes. 
However, given limited funding and capacity in 
many lesser developed insurance markets, an 
insurance ombudsman may not (yet) be in place. 
Moreover, low-income clients may lack the skills 
and resources to submit a complaint to a distant 
ombudsman. In such cases the supervisor must 
receive and handle complaints directly, placing 
additional strain on already limited capacity. In 
response, some countries16 have expressly 
required insurers to establish a consumer 
complaints function. This can be much more 
suitable for low income clients since they should be 
able to access a complaints mechanism in the same 
place they bought the policy. Linked to the 
complaints mechanism, some supervisors have also 
introduced a set of minimum requirements that 
insurers must adhere to for the resolution of 
complaints, also referred to as alternative dispute 
resolution requirements. 
Off-site monitoring involves reporting 
requirements imposed on regulated institutions and 
the statistical and other reviews of such data by the 
supervisory authority. The general objective of off-
site analysis is to detect deterioration in an 
institution’s financial position by comparing its 
current position to its historical experience and to 
that of other insurers. In the inclusive insurance 
sphere it can also involve other objectives, such as 
monitoring client value through tracking claims 
ratios or commission levels and analysing data 
about customer complaints. In some instances, 
industry commits to targeting certain benchmark 
ratios18.  
To be able to undertake the monitoring of the 
impact of access regulations, specific product 
categories can be defined as being targeted by the 
regulator for access purposes. A number of 
jurisdictions have developed or are in the process 
of deliberating such definitions.  
Another relevant aspect in the inclusive insurance 
space is leveraging of regulated institutions to 
monitor activities or entities on behalf of the 
supervisor. For example: insurers may be made 
accountable to keep a register of their 
intermediaries and provide data in this regard to the 
supervisor on request.  
On-site inspections entail a team of inspectors – 
either supervisory staff or outsourced professionals 
– physically visiting the insurer’s premises to 
review areas of regulatory compliance. On-site 
inspection enables the supervisor to obtain 
information and detect problems that cannot be 
obtained or detected through off-site monitoring. 
However, it is a time and resource-intensive 
mechanism. It can be particularly difficult or 
expensive in the access environment, where there 
may be a number of smaller entities that capacity-
constrained supervisors simply cannot all monitor. 
A number of supervisors are engaging with the 
topic of supervisory systems and processes as part 
of the inclusive insurance regulation and 
supervision challenge, considering a risk-based 
approach whereby high risk entities are targeted for 
on-site inspections.  
Enforcement tools  
Enforcement tools are the techniques available to 
regulators to resolve problems with regulated 
institutions. The IAIS Insurance Core Principles of 
2011 state that, at a minimum, the supervisor 
should have the power to issue restrictions on 
business activities21, directions to reinforce 
financial position22 and other directions23. 
Enforcement tools used in the inclusive insurance 
sphere include:  
The threat of prosecution is the main enforcement 
tool used by most regulators. The actions can 
include a restriction on business activities or the 
withdrawal of the insurer’s operating license. The 
threat of prosecution has been used to promote 
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access to insurance in at least two instances: by 
placing penalties on insurers not meeting access 
targets, and by imposing fines when 
microinsurance claims are not paid within a 
specific period. The latter is an example of the 
threat of prosecution being targeted at certain areas 
deemed critical for new markets to develop. 
Pre-emptive problem resolution entails the 
regulator picking up and rectifying regulatory 
breaches before the insurer becomes unable to 
honour its promises. This process is complicated by 
infrequency and inaccuracy of data reported. The 
most demanding level of problem resolution is 
where the regulator takes control of the troubled 
institution by installing an administrator or by 
forcing winding up operations. This may be 
particularly relevant where non-traditional or 
previously informal entities come on board as part 
of a regime to encourage access to insurance.  
Graduated enforcement. Recognising capacity 
constraints in formerly informal entities, part of the 
regulatory approach to promote access to insurance 
may be to allow graduation of compliance over 
time for newly formalised entities24. This could for 
example entail first enforcing nominal registration, 
after which other elements of compliance are 
phased in. Such graduated enforcement can be 
accompanied by support programmes to build 
capacity.  
2.2. Overview of regulatory approaches  
Countries can follow more than one approach. For 
example: India is the prime example of a directive 
approach through the rural and social sector quotas 
set for insurers, but also has a part-concessionary 
regime for microinsurance distribution, plus 
follows a public provision approach in some 
markets. Likewise, a country may follow, for 
example, a public provision approach in certain 
types of insurance, notably agriculture or health, 
while adopting a different approach (such as nudge 
or concessionary), more broadly, depending on the 
interplay between policy objectives. Generally 
speaking, health, agricultural or disaster risk 
insurance may lend itself more to public provision 
due to the fact that these may not be first-order 
products viably supplied to the low-income market 
by the private sector. Products which have become 
more commoditised, for example funeral insurance 
in Southern Africa or extended warranties in Latin 
America, may be more suited to a market based 
approach like the concessionary or nudge approach. 
There is no one rule of which approach is most 
feasible for which product market, as the approach 
adopted will depend on a combination of various 
other variables. 
2.2.1. Public provision approach 
Description. The public provision approach entails 
the most direct state direction to promote access to 
insurance whilst maintaining a market context. The 
state identifies a specific risk to be covered, the 
manner in which it is to be covered and directly 
and/or indirectly subsidises the provision of the 
insurance product to the prescribed target market. 
The underwriting or risk management can either be 
done by the state itself under a pure public 
approach or by commercial insurers under a public 
private partnership. In all cases, though, the risk is 
managed on insurance principles, which 
distinguishes it from directly provided state 
welfare. The distribution of the products can be 
done through normal insurance distribution 
channels, but can also be supported by public 
institutions. 
Public policy objectives. Virtually without 
exception, the public provision approach is used in 
order to achieve a strong public policy objective 
such as healthcare for the population, support for 
agriculture and thus food security, or as part of a 
disaster risk management strategy. In sectors 
considered as critical to the national interest and 
which are costly to administer and intermediate, the 
state therefore frequently steps in to subsidise the 
provision of insurance. This ensures that access to 
these risk mitigation products is substantially 
higher than it otherwise would be. 
Fiscal tools. The public provision approach, unlike 
the other approaches, is characterised by the use of 
fiscal tools. Any one or more of the following tools 
can be utilised: 
Direct premium subsidies - either partial or full 
subsidies 
State entities can take responsibility for, and cover 
the cost of, one or multiple aspects of the 
microinsurance intermediation chain. These can 
include the distribution of products, for example 
through municipal/village-level structures, or the 
provision of technical support, especially in 
agricultural insurance.  
State entities can also be entrusted with the 
responsibility to manage the entire scheme.  
State entities can furthermore provide subsidised 
services - such as in public health schemes 
whereby the state carries the cost of the service, 
such as a hospital. Whilst this may not be directly 
classified as a fiscal tool in the provision of 
insurance it is a related fiscal expenditure that 
indirectly results in lower premiums.  
Regulatory tools. The regulatory tools which are 
commonly used in the implementation of the public 
provision approach include:  
Regulation regarding the underwriters:  
An insurance entity can be given a statutory 
mandate to implement the scheme or to participate 
in it in a specified manner.  
The extent of participation of commercial insurers 
can be regulated. For example, through public 
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procurement processes and regulated public 
contracts.  
Prudential requirements: It follows the regulatory 
framework if commercial insurers are involved  
Product requirements:  
Particular cover can be made compulsory.  
The nature and extent of the cover can be 
prescribed in terms of which benefits are included 
and which are not. This is particularly important in 
the health insurance space.  
The size of the premium/contribution is usually 
prescribed as well.  
Policyholder requirements: Under the public 
provision approach, the choice of who the policy 
holders will be is made a priori:  
The nature of the insured individuals can be 
regulated, for example all the formally employed, 
all the public employees, all farmers with land 
holdings below a certain size, etc.  
It can be specified that the insured individuals 
and/or their employers must make compulsory 
contributions to the cover.  
Surveillance tools. Since the public provision 
approach involves subsidies, a high degree of 
surveillance may be called for. Surveillance tools 
include:  
The full spectrum of public expenditure controls, 
including scrutiny by the legislature;  
The state may establish a dedicated supervisor for a 
particular insurance (such as health insurance) or 
delegate the supervisory role to the relevant 
government department, such as the ministry of 
agriculture or the ministry of health. 
The responsibility of the insurance supervisor may 
be absent, or be limited to oversight of the 
prudential soundness of the scheme or 
intermediaries, with other aspects reserved for the 
relevant government department.  
Enforcement tools. The enforcement tools 
observed in the public provision approach include 
all of the generic enforcement tools. However, as 
the public provision approach entails the use of 
public funds, the level of enforcement may be at a 
higher level than in the other approaches. 
Prosecution, in the event of non-compliance, may 
be pursued directly by the state rather than by the 
insurance supervisor and the application of 
criminal sanctions is more likely. However, the 
converse may also manifest in that weaknesses are 
overlooked due to bureaucratic mismanagement 
and/or the state being unwilling to admit failure.  
Implementation considerations. The 
implementation of the public provision regulatory 
approach raises a number of considerations which 
do not arise in the other approaches:  
Financial sustainability: The financial 
sustainability of implementing this approach is a 
key consideration, particularly if substantial fiscal 
support is required to maintain the scheme. 
Publicly provided schemes or public-private 
partnerships can be intended to be temporary - in 
the hope that the private insurance market will 
grow - or they can be permanent where the state 
takes a view that the target market is unlikely to 
afford any commercially provided alternatives, or 
that the industry is unlikely to be able to viably 
supply into the identified market.  
Crowding out private provision: The impact that 
this approach has on private or commercial 
provision within a particular product market is a 
further factor to consider. For example, in the case 
of health insurance, a state subsidy often catalyses 
private top-up provision and can thus assist to 
catalyse wider private insurance growth in that 
market. On the other hand, an ill-conceived public 
provision scheme could crowd out private 
provision. In such instances, the state will forego 
the opportunity to leverage private investment to 
achieve its goals.  
Policy awareness: Since the public provision 
approach usually does not require an individual 
decision by the policy holder or insured to purchase 
insurance, how beneficiaries are made aware of 
their coverage and when and how to claim are 
important considerations. Without these elements, 
it is unlikely that the target market will reap value 
from the scheme and the underlying social 
objective or goal may hence be undermined.  
Policy coordination between the primary ministry 
that deals with the particular area (e.g. health or 
agriculture) and the ministry of finance and the 
insurance supervisor, as well as between different 
levels of government such as national, 
federal/provincial and district level, is usually 
important to ensure the success of publically 
provided schemes..  
2.2.2. Directive approach  
Description. The directive approach is the 
insurance equivalent of a directed lending policy30. 
It involves the state requiring private insurers to 
provide insurance to a specific segment of  
the population, such as explicitly defined low-
income or rural groups. The insurance is therefore 
provided by private insurers as a requisite to the 
on-going maintenance of their operating license, or 
in order to qualify for incentives or avoid penalties. 
The state determines which target market should be 
covered and effectively forces commercial insurers 
to extend cover to this market. The state may also 
design and define the parameters of the insurance 
product to be distributed to this defined target 
market.  
Public policy objectives: Governments with a 
strong social inclusion focus or a strong rural 
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development emphasis may adopt this approach so 
as to extend access to insurance to these groups. 
The state aims to force insurers to not only cherry 
pick the most lucrative clients, but to extend cover 
more broadly31. Broad based economic 
empowerment objectives32 or indigenisation may 
be another reason to adopt this approach. 
Fiscal tools. The directive approach does not rely 
primarily on fiscal tools as it compels insurers to 
provide access to insurance, thereby reducing the 
need for direct public expenditure to promote 
access to insurance. 
Regulatory tools. A number of regulatory tools 
have been observed in the implementation of the 
directive approach, including: 
Negotiated (and regulated) codes of 
conduct/practice which entails the government 
expressing its policy objective and then expecting 
the industry to propose the best way to achieve this 
objective. 
Clear targets to be achieved by insurers in terms of 
increased access to insurance. This may take the 
form of a mandated proportion of the insurer’s 
clients required to fall within the defined target 
market. 
Product standards or codes as part of a form of 
directed insurance. This may entail explicit 
maximum and minimum amounts of cover for 
specific products, or even a standard 
microinsurance product. 
Delineation of the categories of policyholders to 
whom policies must be sold to comply with the 
directive insurance targets. 
Allotment of specific geographical areas in which 
insurers need to focus their distribution to the low 
income market. For example, a specific proportion 
of their specified low income clients may be 
required by the supervisor to be from a specific 
state or province, with lower registration 
requirements for intermediation to the targeted 
population36. 
Surveillance tools. Surveillance tools include 
requiring insurers to submit an annual report 
detailing an account of progress in meeting the 
directive requirements. By requiring insurers to 
serve a specific target market, this approach creates 
an incentive for insurers to report inflated 
information regarding their provision of insurance 
to the defined target market. Insurers may also have 
an incentive to provide limited value to customers. 
Thus it is important that the supervisor is able to 
verify that the information it receives is accurate. 
An independent body can be created to oversee 
surveillance by conducting reviews and monitoring 
the implementation of the required targets/quotas. 
This can include: 
receiving, considering and approving annual audits 
from each institution 
confirming that these institutions meet the 
directives 
issuing guidance notes on the interpretation and 
application of the requirements 
accrediting agencies to perform audits 
engaging with government, public sector 
institutions and other regulatory agencies to 
promote the implementation of the requirements 
Enforcement tools. Sanctions under the directive 
approach may include direct sanctions such as fines 
or the de-licensing of an insurer that continually 
fails to meet the targets. Indirect sanctions 
observed, particularly in the case of consensual 
targets, include exclusion from public procurement 
for companies that do not comply with the 
regulated directive requirements. 
2.2.3. Concessionary approach 
Description. The concessionary regime is based on 
the proportionality principle, namely the 
recognition “that supervisors need to adjust certain 
supervisory requirements and actions in accordance 
with the nature, scale and complexity of risks posed 
by individual insurers”37. The concessionary 
approach to the facilitation of access to insurance 
creates exceptions to or reductions in the standard 
regulatory requirements so as to reduce the cost of 
providing certain products, often called 
microinsurance. These products are normally 
targeted at lower income market segments and are 
thus defined to be simpler, offer smaller benefits at 
lower premium values, and cover less complex 
risks. In return for the limited operations associated 
with providing these simpler products, as defined, 
the concessionary approach provides regulatory 
concessions in one or a combination of three ways: 
In a limited number of instances observed so far, 
prudential requirements are tailored to the nature, 
scale and complexity of the risk associated with 
microinsurance provision, thus creating a second 
tier or dedicated microinsurance license. 
In most observed cases, intermediation regulation 
is adjusted to allow alternative distribution 
channels and other intermediaries than those 
allowed for in the traditional insurance regime to 
enter the microinsurance distribution space, and/or 
to reduce the qualifying criteria that intermediaries 
must meet. 
In some instances, the institutional form that a 
microinsurer may take is broadened beyond joint 
stock, public or private companies to also 
accommodate appropriately regulated mutual, 
cooperative and other community-based 
organisations. 
In this way, the concessionary approach seeks to 
elicit one or both of the following responses from 
market players: 
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Commercial insurers, due to the lower compliance 
burden, are encouraged to enter or expand their 
reach into a market segment that they would 
otherwise not be able to (or not have the incentive 
to) serve in a cost-effective manner; 
Where a concessionary approach involves creating 
a prudential tier, current informal providers of 
insurance are encouraged to enter the formal 
market through licensing or registration and place 
themselves under formal insurance supervision (a 
process referred to as formalisation). At the same 
time, new, smaller entrants are encouraged to enter 
the market. Where formalisation is the objective, 
the regulatory approach can also include an 
institutional concession to entice cooperative, 
mutual and other community-based entities into the 
formal regulated space. 
The lower compliance burden is associated with a 
variety of restrictions aimed at limiting the 
associated risk (thereby justifying a proportionate 
response). These may include a limited product 
offering, premium and benefit limits, term limits, 
etc. As an entity grows, it may start to find these 
limits restrictive, which provides a natural 
incentive to graduate to compliance with the full 
insurance regime – in return for not being subject 
to these limits anymore38. 
Public policy objectives. The public policy 
objective pursued through a concessionary 
approach is generally access to insurance as a form 
of financial inclusion, which in turn serves broader 
social inclusion goals. Some governments leverage 
the concessionary approach to pursue specific 
stated goals such as empowerment of small 
businesses or consumer protection through 
formalisation of informal practices. Whatever the 
stated objective, this approach involves the state 
explicitly choosing to leverage the market 
mechanism, which speaks to market development 
and facilitation as an objective or orientation. By 
opening up a carved out space to a variety of 
players to compete in offering insurance services to 
the low-income market, the objective is to create a 
level playing field, with proportionate regulation, 
that will facilitate financial inclusion. 
Fiscal tools. Tax concessions are the main fiscal 
tool available under the concessionary approach. 
The following tax concessions have been applied or 
are under consideration:  
A tax amnesty or compliance path provided to 
informal entities which are formalised under the 
concessionary approach in order to aid the 
transition to formality  
A reduced the tax burden in the form of VAT 
exemptions on premiums.  
Some countries have proposed additional fiscal 
incentives for microinsurance through reduced 
income tax for microinsurance providers, though it 
has proven challenging to convince government to 
forego revenue in this way.  
In addition to or instead of tax concessions, 
supervisory fees and levies may be reduced for 
microinsurance operations, representing an indirect 
fiscal tool.  
Regulatory tools. Proportionate regulatory tools are 
used to implement a tiered concessionary regime. 
The most prominent regulatory tools contemplated 
to date include:  
The adoption of a regulatory definition of 
microinsurance – be it stated at a conceptual level, 
in terms of the target market or in terms of defined 
product parameters. Some countries move beyond a 
definition to adopting more detailed product 
standards (for instance limiting permissible 
exclusions, no waiting periods or grace periods to 
be granted to facilitate consumer protection) or 
even standard product templates that insurers can 
tailor.  
Legislation or subordinate legislation providing for 
revised licensing and capital requirements for 
dedicated microinsurers. Some technical 
requirements, such as the need for an actuary, may 
also be adjusted.  
Legislation or subordinate legislation allowing for 
new institutional types of microinsurance providers 
(such as mutual and cooperatives) and setting 
governance requirements in this regard39.  
Legislation or subordinate legislation creating new 
categories of microinsurance-appropriate 
intermediaries, including so-called “third party 
client aggregators” or correspondents such as other 
financial service providers, retail outlets, 
microfinance institutions and NGOs, and 
specifying the entry and ongoing requirements that 
they must meet. Such legislation includes 
stipulations regarding the nature of the relationship 
between the insurer, the third party and the client.  
The configuration of regulatory tools applied 
differs, depending on whether a country opts to 
apply a full or part-concessionary approach and 
what the specific public policy objectives are that it 
wants to achieve. 
Surveillance tools. Effective surveillance is vital to 
the successful implementation of any regime, 
including a concessionary regime. It allows the 
supervisor to monitor the implementation of the 
regime, the compliance with its provisions and the 
value provided to customers (that is, whether the 
space created for microinsurance is delivering on 
the stated objectives). The key surveillance tools 
used in the implementation of the concessionary 
approach include: 
The design and implementation of offsite reporting 
requirements able to deal with the complexities 
presented by a tiered regulatory regime, that is, a 
clear differentiation between products marketed 
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under different business classes and incorporating 
of key performance indicators needed to calculate 
ratios indicative of microinsurance performance 
and client value, including claims ratios, expense 
ratios, lapse ratios and claims processing ratios. 
Adaptations to the on-site supervisory system, 
including provisions in supervisory manuals, to 
investigate microinsurance related business. 
The design and implementation of supervisory 
reporting systems and tools that allow the 
supervisor to effectively monitor and analyse 
reported data, with the findings feeding into the 
supervisory response. 
Monitoring of consumer complaints, with a focus 
on low-income consumers 
Where a concessionary regime entails an expanded 
number of supervised entities, including 
intermediaries, a form of delegated supervision or 
self-regulation is sometimes adopted whereby 
insurers are required to keep registers of 
intermediaries and oversee their compliance with 
regulatory requirements. 
Enforcement tools. Various countries 
implementing a concessionary approach are 
grappling with the challenge of how to ensure 
effective enforcement. It requires dedicated 
capacity within the supervisory authority. It also 
requires cooperation and a strategic enforcement 
plan across multiple public agencies, such as 
revenue authorities, local authorities, the 
supervisory agency for cooperatives, etc. This is 
the case where a concessionary approach entails 
formalisation of previously informal operators, 
where new microinsurance entrants are 
incorporated from other economic spheres (such as 
funeral service providers, credit providers or 
cooperatives) or new types of intermediaries are 
accommodated that do not necessarily have 
insurance as their core business (such as retailers, 
utilities, microfinance providers, NGOs, 
community-based associations, postal networks or 
mobile network operators). In such instances, co-
ordinated enforcement is required across various 
regulatory authorities to ensure that all entities still 
conform to regulatory requirements. 
Another enforcement tool is to allow for graduated 
compliance: for example to first require nominal 
registration, thereafter phasing in compliance 
requirements. Proactive formalisation support for 
entities operating informally (see the discussion 
below) can also be leveraged to promote 
enforcement. 
Implementation considerations. It is important to 
take both intended and unintended consequences of 
regulation into account. Specifically, consumer 
protection objectives need to be balanced with the 
associated costs of providing these products to new 
target markets. By requiring stringent consumer 
protection measures to protect vulnerable low-
income households, for example, regulation may 
actually discourage rather than encourage the 
provision of insurance to the low income market. 
For example, a requirement for onerous 
qualifications of agents may cause insurers to 
dispense with the agent model and distribute 
insurance through other channels which may 
actually have a substantially inferior sales process. 
Part of the aim of a concessionary regime is 
therefore to explicitly take note of and mitigate 
such unintended consequences. 
As part of a concessionary regime, the supervisor 
may detail standardised product features or 
parameters to be offered to the market, or may set 
certain product standards. By keeping products 
simple and promoting it industry-wide, the 
supervisor can commoditise the product, meaning 
that individuals do not require the same level of 
skills to engage with the product as compared to a 
more complex version. Promotion of product 
standards by the supervisor would also complement 
a concessionary regime by building awareness and 
demand for the insurance product in the market. 
However, too detailed product specifications 
without sufficient incentives attached to the 
provision of the product may cause the industry not 
to write products under the specific category at all. 
The concessionary approach requires significant 
skills and resource capacity among existing 
industry players to branch into new operations, as 
well as for new entrants (be they new players or 
informal entities coming into the formal fold). The 
supervisor can support the industry by providing 
support to revamp the insurance industry’s 
processes and technologies. It could also consider 
capacity building support for formalising entities, 
for example support to develop business plans or 
complete the registration process. Similarly, a 
concessionary regime has significant capacity 
implications for the supervisor itself – requiring 
surveillance systems, scaled enforcement and 
supervision of new providers and/or intermediaries. 
2.2.4. Nudge approach 
Description. The nudge approach relies 
predominantly on market forces to move insurers 
downmarket and increase access to insurance. The 
state plays a facilitative role in providing the 
environmental enablers such as requisite 
infrastructure or signals of policy support to allow 
insurers to successfully supply insurance to the 
low-income market. The state can also apply moral 
suasion. The difference between the concessionary 
and nudge approaches is that the nudge approach 
takes the view that the overall compliance burden 
applicable to insurance providers and 
intermediaries is not high enough to warrant a 
proportionate regulatory framework with 
corresponding financial incentives (for private 
companies to move down market) and the capacity 
implications (especially for the insurance 
supervisor) that it entails, but that the public policy 
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objectives can be achieved through other market-
based means. 
Public policy objectives. The public policy 
objectives under a nudge approach are similar to 
those outlined for the concessionary approach, i.e. 
to serve as many citizens as possible with private 
insurance. Similar to the concessionary approach, 
the nudge approach differs from the public 
provision and directive approaches in that the 
regulator holds the view that financial inclusion 
objectives in the insurance market can be achieved 
without the need for state subsidy, or direct 
intervention. 
Fiscal tools. As the approach takes the view that 
direct state intervention is not required to promote 
access to insurance, no fiscal tools are utilised as 
part of this approach. 
Regulatory tools. The following observed 
regulatory tools aid the implementation of a nudge 
approach:  
A strong policy approach in favour of financial 
inclusion sends a signal to the market, highlighting 
the importance of increasing access to insurance.  
Creating a regulatory framework for 
microinsurance products, but without incorporating 
any significant concessions on the regulatory 
requirements applicable to insurance products in 
general. This could include consumer protection 
measures, including dispute resolution, that are 
particularly adapted to the low-income market.  
Regulation to promote financial inclusion in other 
related fields, for example non-bank agents or 
payment systems, may make it easier to distribute 
insurance, although these regulatory actions are not 
directly related to insurance.  
Surveillance tools. An important role for the 
supervisor under the nudge approach is to monitor 
the actual extension of private commercial 
insurance to the target market. In this way, the on-
going effectiveness of the approach in increasing 
access to insurance is evaluated in order to 
determine whether not directly intervening remains 
the optimal approach for the state to achieve its 
goals.  
Enforcement tools. Although this approach entails 
the state taking a hands-off approach towards the 
development of the industry, enforcement of 
existing regulation remains important to ensure that 
consumers are not exploited and that industry 
players remain financially sound and are able to 
honour their contractual obligations. Thus the 
generic enforcement tools would all be applicable 
under the nudge approach.  
2.2.5. Long-term market development approach  
Description. The long-term market development 
(LTMD) approach applies where the focus of the 
policy-makers and regulators is to establish an 
insurance industry with the necessary skills, 
institutions and market presence, and to grow their 
own supervisory capacity, before specific focus is 
turned to growing retail insurance specifically for 
low-income households. Thus a longer-term view 
to increasing access to insurance is taken, with the 
primary focus being on developing the industry at 
large. This approach is generally found in under-
developed insurance markets. It recognises the 
importance of the sequencing of development and 
that regulation designed for developed markets 
could have unintended adverse consequences if 
applied in a blanket way to less developed markets 
without consideration for the specific 
characteristics and financial sector development 
priorities of that market. This approach then 
indirectly benefits access to insurance over the 
longer term by building capacity and support 
infrastructure.  
Public policy objectives. The LTMD approach 
recognises that the limitations41 in the existing 
state of the market make it unfeasible – and an 
inefficient use of resources – to pursue increased 
access for low-income households to insurance as 
an explicit objective in the short-term. Thus the 
overriding objective is the establishment or 
capacitation of the market. This does not mean that 
access and the welfare benefits that it promises is 
not an important public policy objective – just that 
pragmatism comes into play when determining the 
actual regulatory and supervisory priorities. 
Countries with this approach may officially have a 
financial access development mandate, but this 
does not automatically signify that such mandate is 
actionable or that steps are actively being taken to 
achieve it. 
Fiscal tools. The LTMD approach entails fiscal 
expenditure to invest in underlying infrastructure 
and processes such as the establishment and 
building of an insurance supervisor and related 
systems, training insurance professionals, building 
actuarial skills, etc. 
Regulatory tools. The regulatory tools applied as 
part of the LTMD approach are primarily aimed at 
helping to establish the market, rather than 
regulating for inclusive insurance markets per se. 
They include: 
A broader financial sector development framework. 
Market liberalisation (where this is not already the 
case) 
Putting the basic insurance regulatory framework 
in place, including drafting of subordinate 
legislation and guidance 
Compelling individuals to have certain insurance 
products, for example by requiring third party 
vehicle insurance or workers’ compensation 
insurance. Such tools can be instituted to meet 
societal needs but also to help kick-start the 
insurance market. 
Effect of Insurance Regulation on Market Development 
 
Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies, 3(1) January, 2015 62 
Surveillance tools. Where surveillance is 
concerned, the focus under the LTMD approach is 
on creating the relevant surveillance tools for the 
market as a whole, including: 
Establishing basic reporting frameworks 
Creating a database for the supervisor and building 
supervisory systems and skills for analysis 
Building up knowledge of the market and how it 
evolves 
Enforcement tools. In a nascent market, 
enforcement capacity is grown as supervisory 
capacity and surveillance tools are being built up. 
Enforcement tools typically focus on prudential 
supervision and market conduct of existing players 
and the enforcement priority may be to build the 
necessary supervisory systems in this regard. Other 
considerations are the establishment of consumer 
redress channels, such as the creation of an 
insurance ombudsman. 
Implementation considerations. A number of 
considerations need to be taken into account when 
implementing a LTMD approach: 
The public policy driving force for financial access 
is unlikely to lie primarily with an insurance 
supervisor. Rather, another financial sector 
authority like the Central Bank or the Ministry of 
Finance will typically be the custodian of the 
country’s access priorities. This requires 
coordination. 
The insurance supervisory authority is likely to 
struggle with resource constraints as it is being 
established. The funding model for the authority, 
be it through state (tax-funded) resources or 
industry levies, may still be under consideration. 
This will have implications for the operations of 
the supervisory authority and what agenda it can 
take on. 
In a nascent market private insurance is likely to be 
dominated by non-life insurance rather than life 
insurance. Yet the latter is where microinsurance 
usually evolves. Thus the normal market 
development curve must take its course before 
access could become a feasible priority. 
What leads to the adoption of specific regulatory 
approaches? 
The previous section described the observed 
regulatory approaches as well as the policy and 
regulatory instruments used to implement them. 
But what approach is most appropriate in a given 
market? The answer will depend on the contextual 
and market factors present in a country. 
This section identifies nine interrelated 
conditioning factors which have been observed in 
markets where specific approaches have been 
adopted. In practice, countries may adopt 
approaches prematurely without taking these 
conditioning factors into account. The analysis 
attempts to identify linkages between prevailing 
conditions and specific regulatory approaches as a 
basis for consideration by insurance regulators and 
supervisors. It represents a first attempt at making 
sense of the way that approaches manifest across 
countries and regarding the interplay between 
various conditioning factors, based on country 
evidence emerging to date. As the history of 
approaches described is still recent, the 
conditioning factors identified here are based on 
limited observations to date. Ongoing research and 
tracking across countries is required to arrive at 
more conclusive findings. 
3.1. Context factors  
3.1.1. Macroeconomic conditions  
What do we mean by macroeconomic conditions? 
Macroeconomic conditions refer to the overarching 
state of the economy insofar as it affects the 
development of the insurance sector and access to 
insurance. Macroeconomic conditions can include 
pervasive macroeconomic concerns such as 
hyperinflation or a fiscal crisis, or the effect of 
GDP growth on incomes and thus insurance.  
Relevance for insurance. Macroeconomic 
conditions can substantially impact insurance. 
Overarching macroeconomic conditions determine 
the environment in which the insurance market 
operates and thus the ability and incentive for 
insurers to expand. Macro factors such as inflation 
can also impact on the value proposition of 
insurance to the market or impact on consumer 
trust and perceptions (hyperinflation erodes 
insurance value, which  
typically undermines trust in the insurance sector). 
Low GDP growth rates and income levels would 
influence the take-up of insurance as low income 
levels constrain affordability amongst the low-
income target market. Conversely, strong GDP 
growth and rising income levels can be a natural 
driver of the creation and growth of insurance 
markets.  
Implications for regulatory approach. The ruling 
macroeconomic conditions will, alongside other 
conditioning factors, affect which regulatory 
approach is most appropriate. For example:  
A country with significant macroeconomic 
concerns such as hyperinflation or a fiscal crisis 
will have more pressing priorities than increasing 
access to insurance. Hence the long-term market 
development approach may be the most appropriate 
– or indeed only feasible – option until the 
overriding macroeconomic issues are resolved. 
More important perhaps, countries that have 
suffered from hyperinflation have found that it 
takes a number of years before the confidence of 
the market in particularly life insurance - the utility 
of which requires relative stability in the currency - 
returns. And then it tends to be younger clients that 
buy life insurance.  
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Severely low income levels within the economy 
could push the supervisor towards a public 
provision or long-term market development 
approach if they undermine affordability to the 
point of precluding an approach that relies on 
market forces. However, low income levels could 
also entail low income tax revenues, thereby 
restricting the capacity of the state to provide 
insurance. Therefore a public provision approach 
would only be viable in the event that the state 
earns substantial revenues from alternative sources.  
How could the supervisor influence 
macroeconomic conditions? The insurance 
supervisor has limited scope to address 
macroeconomic conditions. Rather, the 
macroeconomic context can largely be regarded as 
a “given” within which supervisors must find the 
most appropriate response. However, by for 
example approving insurance for credit guarantee 
products for SMMEs, insurance supervisors could 
indirectly affect macroeconomic conditions as the 
availability of such insurance could improve access 
to finance for SMMEs, which in turn contributes to 
economic growth. Similarly, encouraging the 
uptake of agricultural insurance products could 
help combat food price inflation, thereby impacting 
on the economy. 
3.1.2. Physical infrastructure 
What is physical infrastructure? This conditioning 
factor refers to any relevant infrastructure required 
to effectively administer or distribute insurance, 
including payments infrastructure, financial sector 
infrastructure, electricity, internet connectivity and 
mobile network coverage. 
Relevance for insurance. The existence of physical 
infrastructure is crucial to the administration and 
distribution of insurance. For example, without 
efficient payment and settlement system 
mechanisms in place, it may be substantially more 
difficult and more expensive for insurers to collect 
premiums on a regular basis and to pay claims. 
Likewise, limited internet connectivity or 
unreliable electricity networks undermine 
communication and integration of systems between 
branches and head office, and limited financial 
sector infrastructure could mean that the ability to 
sell insurance on the back of other financial 
services, or to leverage their geographic footprint, 
is limited. Uptake of insurance will also be 
determined by the state of development of the real 
sector, for example: take-up of health insurance 
will depend on the level of development of state 
hospitals and clinics and the efficient supply of 
agricultural index insurance is dependent on the 
availability of reliable meteorological data and the 
existence of appropriately equipped weather 
stations. 
Implications for regulatory approach. In an 
environment of limited infrastructure, a more 
market-based approach, notably the concessionary 
and nudge approaches, could result in private firms 
only targeting those sectors that they can easily 
reach with the existing infrastructure. Where there 
are severe infrastructure constraints, for example in 
the deep rural areas of many countries, a public 
provision or directive approach could leverage state 
support and infrastructure to compensate for 
constraints to private provision. 
How can the supervisor influence infrastructure? 
Investment in physical infrastructure falls beyond 
the realm of the insurance supervisor’s influence. 
However, a proactive supervisor may coordinate 
with relevant ministries (for example though a 
financial or social inclusion inter-governmental 
policy group) to advocate for greater investment in 
key infrastructure, such as the development of IT 
transaction platforms, and to open up financial 
sector infrastructure. For example: in a number of 
countries, mobile payments platforms are seen as 
potential mechanisms to overcome the limitation 
that financial payments networks that are restricted 
to cities and larger towns. The insurance supervisor 
can advocate for such networks to be leveraged for 
distribution of other financial services. 
3.2. Latent demand 
Whether there is latent demand for risk mitigation 
in certain product areas or defined target markets is 
a primary factor determining the approach adopted. 
What is latent demand? Demand refers to actual 
underlying demand to purchase an insurance 
product or pay for risk cover for a particular risk 
event. In the event there are insufficient insurers to 
meet this need or the products are not distributed in 
a manner that will realise the demand it will remain 
latent and manifest in insufficient formal insurers 
to meet this demand, it will frequently manifest in 
the development of informal risk pooling 
mechanisms. Note that a lack of demand does not 
necessarily mean there is no underlying need for 
the product. Even though individuals or households 
may have insurable needs, some consumers may 
simply not have enough income to find insurance 
affordable or may not be aware that insurance is an 
option to deal with their need. 
Relevance for insurance. Latent demand means that 
people are aware of and will be prepared to pay for 
the insurance product. Without latent demand there 
can be no voluntary sales of insurance policies and 
thus no private commercial market. 
Implications for regulatory approach. Latent 
demand is a prerequisite for market provision. If 
there is no latent demand, although an existing 
underlying need, then a public provision approach 
will be the only viable option to increase access to 
insurance. Thus, in a hypothetical hierarchy of 
conditioning factors, latent demand may be one of 
the most important. 
How could the supervisor influence latent demand? 
The supervisor can indirectly impact latent demand 
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by undertaking targeted financial education 
initiatives, including on the benefits of insurance 
from regulated rather than non-regulated providers, 
or by requiring insurers or the industry to do so. In 
the absence of latent demand, public provision may 
be the only short-term option to directly increase 
access to insurance. However, if financial 
education is effectively implemented together with 
a public provision approach, latent demand may be 
catalysed over time and other approaches, such as 
the directive or concessionary approach, may 
become feasible. Furthermore, the supervisor could 
promote the formation of demand by allowing the 
bundling of products so that product elements or 
features for which there is latent demand can be 
bundled with products for which there is not yet a 
latent demand, but indeed a need or a strong public 
policy imperative. 
3.3. Supply 
The attention now turns to those conditioning 
factors related to the operation of the market. 
Sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.2 consider the market “reality 
check” on what approach will be feasible in a 
particular market, namely: (i) the level of market 
development; (ii) the impact of market failures; and 
(iii) the presence of informality. 
3.3.1. Level of market development 
The level of market development is comprised of 
three elements: breadth, penetration and financial 
soundness: 
Market breadth 
What is market breadth? The breadth of the 
insurance sector refers to the access of the 
population to a wide range and choice of products 
and providers. 
Implications for regulatory approach. A 
concessionary or nudge approach is enabled by a 
market with existing breadth. As the market is 
already providing good choice, it may just need to 
be nudged into increasing access. Similarly, the 
concessionary approach is premised on the 
assumption that there are insurers in the market 
ready to roll out products if a proportionate space is 
created. At the same time, the concessionary 
approach also aims to increase breadth by creating 
a space for more players (including formalisation 
of informal players), thereby expanding clients’ 
options for formal providers and products. In the 
same vein, the nudge approach aims to increase 
breadth by triggering more product options for the 
low-income market. 
A lack of breadth, alongside various other 
conditioning factors, may imply that the market is 
unable to increase access to insurance with its 
current resources. In such instances, government 
may need to “takes matters in its own hands”, 
pointing towards a directive or public provision 
approach, neither of which requires breadth. If 
breadth as well as state capacity is limited, the 
long-term market development approach may be 
the most appropriate. 
How could the supervisor influence market 
breadth? As part of a long-term market 
development approach, the supervisor may embark 
on various initiatives to support market 
infrastructure development within the insurance 
sector in an effort to promote breadth, for example 
modernisation of insurers’ system platforms. Other 
actions that can support breadth include: 
liberalising a former state-owned monopoly to 
permit local and foreign players to enter; permitting 
a wider range of products and bundling options; 
implementing regulatory measures aimed at 
generally reducing the cost of delivery; or building 
expertise to develop new products, for example 
through data collection and actuarial analysis or 
bringing in foreign reinsurers. 
Market penetration 
What is market penetration? The penetration of an 
insurance sector is defined as the size (in terms of 
turnover or revenue) and the state of development 
of the insurance sector as measured in assets or 
premiums relative to GDP. 
Implications for regulatory approach. A reasonable 
level of market penetration is important for the 
nudge approach and to a lesser extent for the 
concessionary approach, as these approaches rely 
on market forces to move insurers downmarket. 
Reasonable penetration would also be an advantage 
for the directive approach, as a better developed 
market would be in a better position to extend 
insurance to the unserved when compelled by the 
state. The public provision approach may be a 
response to low penetration alongside other 
conditioning factors. Similarly, very low 
penetration may indicate that a long-term market 
development approach is called for rather than a 
direct access emphasis. 
How could the supervisor influence market 
penetration? The supervisor increases market 
penetration with all the same efforts as market 
breadth - barring the specific product regulations. 
In addition, penetration may grow in a scenario 
where, for prudential reasons, the supervisor 
encourages mergers and market consolidation to 
create larger, better capitalised insurers. 
Financial soundness 
What is financial soundness? In the insurance 
sphere, financial soundness or health is an 
equivalent term for solvency. It refers to the 
“[ability] of an insurer to meet its obligations to 
policyholders when they fall due. Solvency 
includes capital adequacy but also involves other 
aspects of a solvency regime, for example, 
technical provisions, qualitative aspects (such as 
would be addressed in an enterprise risk 
management framework), supervisory review and 
supervisory reporting”45. Financial soundness is 
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intricately linked to the stability of the insurance 
sector. 
Implications for regulatory approach. Financial 
soundness is important in all approaches other than 
the public provision approach, where insurers can 
be supported by the state. However, it is 
particularly important in the directive approach as 
insurers need to be able to absorb the increased 
costs related to offering insurance to specific 
groups that they may not have found viable clients 
otherwise. 
How could the supervisor influence financial 
soundness? All prudential regulation is 
fundamentally aimed at ensuring soundness and 
stability, regardless of which regulatory approach is 
adopted. Specific considerations include risk based 
regulation, actuarial pricing and reinsurance. . 
3.3.2. Informality 
What is informality? Informality refers to 
unlicensed schemes offering risk mitigation 
products – either in contravention of the insurance 
legislation, or in a grey area outside the official 
definition of insurance. High levels of informality 
in the insurance market with concomitant consumer 
protection concerns can harm the perception of 
insurance in general amongst potential (and 
existing) clients, thereby reducing client trust and 
the demand for insurance. At the same time, 
informal risk-pooling at community level (for 
example through burial societies or community-
based health schemes) can provide solutions to risk 
management needs where the formal market fails to 
reach and can play an important social and 
financial role in the community. 
Implications for regulatory approach. If high levels 
of informality in a market lead to consumer 
protection issues, an active regulatory and 
enforcement approach is required to formalise 
informal institutions -regardless of the regulatory 
approach adopted. Informal institutions may not 
have the capacity to comply with the full suite of 
regulatory requirements applicable to incumbents, 
meaning that they would opt to remain informal or, 
if formalisation is effectively enforced, will cease 
to exist. The latter may not be desirable given other 
policy objectives such as empowerment of small 
businesses. Neither may their operations or 
products be as complex as that of formal insurers. 
Insurers operate outside of the law because it is 
beneficial for them do so relative to the perceived 
costs of entering the regulatory fold, therefore in 
order to incentivise these entities to formalise, the 
costs of doing so need to be reduced. A 
concessionary approach creates tiered regulatory 
requirements proportionate to the nature, scale and 
complexity of risks. It thus creates a dedicated 
space into which informal entities can formalise, 
making it the appropriate regulatory approach to 
address informality, provided there is sufficient 
supervisory capacity to implement it. 
However, informality in itself may not be a major 
concern provided it does not result in consumer 
protection issues. In an undeveloped market, the 
informal market may arise due to latent demand 
and fulfil an important risk mitigation and social 
support need not being addressed by the formal 
market. In such instances, the long-term market 
development approach would be most appropriate 
in achieving formalisation over time. All of the 
other approaches may also implicitly facilitate 
formalisation by forcing, enabling or encouraging 
formal players to compete in the market space 
currently served by informal means, or by the state 
stepping in directly and thereby potentially 
crowding out informal provision. 
How can the supervisor influence informality? 
Experience shows that addressing informality 
requires a coordinated approach amongst various 
public agencies. Where informality relates directly 
to the provision of risk mitigation products, the role 
of coordinating such agencies naturally devolves to 
the insurance supervisor. 
3.4. Public sector and regulatory framework 
Four conditioning factors that relate to the public 
sphere emerge cross-country: 
the availability of public funding; 
the state of public infrastructure; 
supervisory capacity; and 
the overall compliance burden on the insurance 
sector. 
3.4.1. Availability of public funding 
What do we mean by availability of public 
funding? In the context of inclusive insurance, the 
availability of public funding simply refers to 
whether the state is able to afford the significant 
outlays required for state-subsidised 
microinsurance. It thus relates to the fiscal 
implications of the choice of regulatory approach. 
Donor funding is also considered a form of public 
funding. 
Relevance for insurance. If public funding is 
available, the state is able to pay for premiums or to 
provide public resources to support other aspects of 
the insurance value chain. 
Implications for regulatory approach. The 
availability of public funding is a prerequisite for 
the public provision approach, which relies on 
state-funded risk mitigation initiatives. For the 
other approaches, the availability of public funding 
for implementation purposes is not of direct 
relevance. However, other approaches also require 
funding, for example to create a concessionary 
regime, licence informal players, and improve 
systems and staff capacity. 
How can the supervisor influence public funding? 
The supervisor does not have influence over central 
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government’s budget. However, by highlighting the 
relevance of improving access to insurance and 
requesting funding in a timely manner, the 
supervisor may be able to influence budgetary 
allocations. Furthermore, it typically generates 
revenue through licensing fees and industry levies, 
part of which could be dedicated to the promotion 
of inclusive insurance markets. 
3.4.2. Public infrastructure 
What is public infrastructure? Public infrastructure 
refers to the state’s administrative capacity to 
implement policies and programmes. Supervisory 
capacity is excluded here as, due to its direct 
importance to the insurance market, it warrants 
separate discussion (see Section 3.4.3 below). 
Public infrastructure includes national, regional or 
provincial and local administrations. 
Relevance for insurance. The ability of the state to 
make good on its promises is relevant for all 
sectors where the state could play a direct role as 
provider or enabler – including insurance. 
Examples in the insurance domain include health 
service networks that are able both to distribute 
health insurance and also render health services, 
national and regional agricultural and 
meteorological departments that can be utilised to 
implement risk mitigation programs for agricultural 
insurance programs and even to undertake damage 
assessments on behalf of commercial insurers, or 
local authority structures that can collect and partly 
pay insurance premiums on behalf of their citizens. 
Implications for regulatory approach. The 
implementation ability of the state is a key 
consideration when deciding whether a public 
provision approach is feasible. Different types of 
infrastructure will be necessary for different types 
of products. For example, a network of health 
service providers is necessary to implement a 
national health insurance scheme. To implement 
agricultural index insurance, adequate weather 
tracking infrastructure is required – this is a 
limitation to this type of publicly provided 
insurance in many countries. 
How can the supervisor influence public 
infrastructure? Developing public infrastructure is 
largely beyond the influence of the supervisor, 
although effective coordination with relevant 
government departments may support 
implementation of insurance-specific programmes. 
3.4.3. Supervisory capacity  
What is supervisory capacity? Supervisory capacity 
refers to the ability of the insurance supervisor to 
effectively implement regulations, monitor the 
insurance industry and enforce sanctions against 
misconduct. Funding is a key aspect of supervisory 
capacity as it allows the supervisor to attract and 
develop the appropriate capacity. The extent of its 
human resources, their technical skills and 
experience will determine the overall ability of the 
supervisor to oversee the national insurance 
industry. A newly formed insurance supervisor will 
likely be less effective in its roles than one with 
experience.  
Relevance for insurance. The principal objective of 
supervision is to promote the maintenance of a fair, 
safe and stable insurance sector for the benefit and 
protection of policyholders (IAIS, 2011). The 
supervisor’s role in defining and enforcing 
regulation is also important to market players, as a 
clear definition of the rules removes uncertainty, 
thereby paving the way for investment and other 
strategic market decisions.  
Implications for regulatory approach. Certain of 
the regulatory approaches utilised to extend access 
to insurance require more supervisory capacity or 
are more supervision-intensive than others. In 
particular, the concessionary approach and to a 
lesser extent the directive approach require 
sufficient supervisory capacity to render them 
effective. Regulation which delegates certain 
aspects of insurance supervision to market players, 
for example by making insurers ultimately liable 
for all distribution and intermediation partners’ 
actions, can help reduce the required supervisory 
capacity. The supervisory capacity demands differ 
as follows across the five approaches:  
Public provision implemented by state, limiting 
onus on supervisory capacity. The public provision 
approach is heavily reliant on public infrastructure 
(see Section 3.4.2 above), but does not necessarily 
place high demands on the insurance supervisor’s 
capacity. The insurance is primarily implemented 
by the state and hence the role of the supervisor to 
monitor and oversee the private market becomes 
less important. More capacity will be required if 
private insurers are utilised to perform 
underwriting and/or distribution of publicly 
provided programs.  
Extent of supervisory capacity for directive 
approach dependent on number of insurers. The 
directive approach requires supervisory capacity as 
it falls within the ambit of the supervisor to ensure 
that the commercial insurers fulfil the state-
provided access directive. However, in a market 
with a limited number of large commercial insurers 
the degree of supervisory capacity required to 
implement the directive approach is lower than in a 
scenario where a large number of smaller players 
need to be effectively monitored.  
High supervisory capacity required for 
concessionary approach. The concessionary 
approach requires the highest level of supervisory 
capacity as the adoption of this approach can result 
in a number of smaller players and/or additional 
numbers and new types of intermediaries entering 
the market. The concessionary approach also 
requires the supervisor to monitor multiple tiers of 
regulation, making supervision more complex and 
requiring greater resources. The supervisory 
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capacity requirements will be higher under a full 
concessionary approach spanning prudential and 
market conduct elements than when for example 
only the intermediation space is granted 
concessions.  
Market focus of nudge approach has limited 
supervisory capacity requirements. The nudge 
approach would normally not require more 
supervisory capacity than normal insurance 
supervision without any inclusive market focus.  
Supervisory constraints a major conditioning 
factor for long-term market development approach. 
The long-term market development approach 
requires the least supervisory capacity as it does 
not call for new regulation and does not seek 
directly to expand the number of insurers or 
intermediaries. Indeed, one of the factors leading to 
its adoption may be severely constrained 
supervisory capacity.  
How can the supervisor influence capacity? 
Supervisors continually strive to improve and 
expand their capacity, including by remaining up to 
date with global trends and research to inform their 
decision-making. The capacity of the supervisor is 
strongly impacted by the level of funding extended 
to it by the state, as this determines the number and 
quality of technical staff it can afford to employ. 
Other means of enhancing supervisory capacity 
could be through delegated supervision or the use 
of self-regulatory organisations. 
3.4.4. Compliance burden 
What is the compliance burden? The compliance 
burden refers to the overall level, in terms of entry 
barriers and associated compliance costs, of 
regulatory requirements imposed by the existing 
body of insurance laws and regulations. 
Relevance for insurance. The nature of the 
compliance burden impacts the cost structure of 
insurers. High compliance costs increase per 
transaction intermediation costs for all insurance 
products sold by insurance providers, thereby 
negatively impacting on the ability of insurers to 
extend their operations to lower-premium 
environments. However, overly lenient regulatory 
requirements may also be detrimental to increasing 
access to insurance. Low barriers to entry have 
been observed to encourage multiple entrants to the 
industry. Whilst this may increase competition in 
the industry, too many insurance providers in a 
small market means that they will struggle to 
achieve sufficient scale to benefit from the 
economies of scale associated with a larger risk 
pool. Also, low entry barriers can allow financially 
unsound providers to enter the market and lead to 
market malpractices due to intense competition, 
eventually resulting in a break-down in trust when 
such insurers fail to deliver on their promises. 
Implications for regulatory approach. Broadly 
speaking, the higher the regulatory requirements in 
the mainstream insurance market, the less likely it 
is that insurers will naturally progress down-
market. Thus, if the compliance burden is not 
proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of 
the risk, the state may be required to address access 
to insurance directly. For example, a high 
compliance burden can either prompt the regulator 
to opt for concessionary elements aimed at a 
proportionate compliance burden to allow smaller 
and more innovative players to enter and informal 
players to formalise, or can necessitate greater 
direct state provision as market players are unable 
to reach the target market. Alternatively, one of the 
aims under the long-term market development 
approach can be to improve efficiency and reduce 
disproportionate compliance requirements over 
time. 
How can the supervisor influence the compliance 
burden? The supervisor can affect the compliance 
burden on insurers by increasing or reducing the 
regulatory requirements over which it has control. 
3.5. Interplay between the conditioning factors: 
determining the most appropriate response 
No approach will be the result of only one 
conditioning factor: it is the combination of and 
interplay between various conditioning factors 
within a specific market environment that makes a 
given approach more appropriate to that 
environment. 
Certain conditioning factors may have a greater 
hierarchical 'importance' than others in determining 
the regulatory approach adopted in a particular 
country. For example, the first consideration may 
be whether there is latent demand for insurance 
among the target market. If this conditioning factor 
is present, the regulator may next ask itself what 
will be feasible to implement given the level of 
supervisory capacity and public infrastructure. 
Below, we summarise the set of conditions that 
would seem to be conducive to the implementation 
of each of the approaches: 
Public provision approach. The public provision 
approach can be applied in an environment where 
public funding for subsidies is available and where 
there is a sufficient existing level of public 
infrastructure. Where commercial insurers are 
involved, they should also be capable of delivering. 
Directive approach. The directive approach can be 
followed in an environment with a relatively low 
level of market breadth, but sufficient depth and 
financial soundness and some latent demand. 
Concessionary approach. The concessionary 
approach requires a reasonably well developed 
market with existing latent demand and sufficient 
physical infrastructure. It may be desirable where 
there are high levels of informality, or where the 
insurance sector is already subject to a high 
existing compliance burden that makes insurance 
provision to the low-income market too expensive 
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for current players. A full concessionary approach 
furthermore requires relatively high supervisory 
capacity in order to successfully supervise multiple 
entities under tiered regulation. The supervisory 
capacity requirements reduce considerably for a 
partial concessionary approach only focusing on 
the intermediation side, especially where insurers 
can be leveraged to register non-traditional 
intermediaries and be accountable for their actions. 
Nudge approach. Like the concessionary approach, 
the nudge approach is market-based and so is 
reliant on existing latent demand and a sufficient 
degree of market development and physical and 
financial sector infrastructure. However, in contrast 
to the concessionary approach the nudge approach 
will be most appropriate if there is a low current 
compliance burden. It is suited to environments in 
which the insurance market will progress down-
market in an organic fashion and the state merely 
needs to fulfil an enabling and encouraging role in 
supporting market development. 
Long-term market development approach. The 
long-term market development approach is the 
default approach if other conditions are not 
favourable. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper identified five observed regulatory 
approaches to promote access to insurance 
observed across jurisdictions and across product 
markets. These approaches fall along a continuum 
primarily defined by the level of state intervention, 
ranging from direct public provision, on the one 
hand, to gradually building market development, 
on the other hand. Several interrelated conditioning 
factors together determine which approach will be 
appropriate in each given market environment. As 
new country evidence comes on board, especially 
on the medium to long-term impact of different 
approaches, these conditioning factors can be 
adapted, expanded and refined. Similarly, emerging 
evidence will enable a refinement of the analysis of 
the approaches themselves. 
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